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RONICALLY, Winterbottom v. Wright,2 the case which has had
the most influence on the manufacturer's liability, was not an
action against a manufacturer, but one against a contractor. The
oft-quoted "rule" in this case was actually dicta, the court going
no further than to hold that a defendant who has undertaken to
do work for another, which is necessary to the safety of the person
or property of a third-party plaintiff, does not thereby become
liable for a failure to perform his contract competently merely
because the third party knows of the contract and chooses to rely
on its performance.
The words of Lord Abinger, who foresaw "the most absurd
and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit,... un-
less we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
* B.S., Iowa State College; second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 See also Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Oregon L. R. 119
(1958); Products Liability: A Symposium, 24 Tenn. L. R. 787 (1957); Strict
Liability of Manufacturers: A Symposium, 24 Tenn. L. R. 923 (1957); Harper
and James, Torts, ch. 28, 1534 (1956); Prosser, Torts, ch. 17, 497 (2d ed.
1955); James, Products Liability, 34 Tex. L. R. 44, 192 (1955); Wilson,
Products Liability, 43 Calif. L. R. 614, 809 (1955); Dickerson, Products
Liability and the Food Consumer (1951); Miller, Liability of a Manufacturer
for Harm Done by a Product, 3 Syracuse L. R. 106 (1951); Steensland,
Liability of the Manufacturer to the Ultimate Consumer Under Modern
Merchandizing Practices, 9 Mont. L. R. 101 (1948); 164 A. L. R. 569 (1946);
Clark, Let the Maker Beware, 19 St. John's L. R. 85 (1945); Seefeld, Tort
Liability of Manufacturers to Users of Their Goods, 25 Marq. L. R. 173
(1941); Niebler, Torts-Breach of Warranty-Liability of Manufacturer of
Defective Chattels, 22 Marq. L. R. 136 (1938); Ducker, Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 12 St. John's L. R. 281 (1938); Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's
Liability to Persons Other Than Immediate Vendees, 24 Va. L. R. 134 (1937);
Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Minn. L. R. 752 (1935); Rice,
Liability of a Manufacturer to a Sub-Vendee, 18 Cornell L. Q. 445 (1932);
Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 45 L. Q. R. 343 (1929); Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers
and Vendors, 10 Minn. L. R. 1 (1925).
2 10 Mees & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 11 L. J. Ex. 415 (1842). In this
case, the driver of a mail coach was injured when it collapsed, throwing
him from the seat. It was alleged that the defendant had a contract with
the Postmaster General to keep the coach in "fit, proper, safe and secure
state and condition," and that since he had not done so, he was liable.
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parties who entered into them," 3 were taken to mean that the
liability for negligence in performance of a contract or manufac-
ture of goods to be sold was to be restricted to those who were
parties to the contract or the sale.
This interpretation was strengthened by the concurring
opinion of Alderson, B., who said that:
If we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue in such a
case, there is no point at which such actions would stop.
The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those
who enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that,
there is no reason why we should not go fifty. The only
real argument in favor of the actions is, that this is a case
of hardship; but that might have been obviated if the plain-
tiff had made himself a party to the contract 4 ;
and by Rolfe, B., who said that:
The duty (with breach of which the defendant was
charged) . . . is shown to have arisen solely from the con-
tract; and the fallacy consists in the use of that word "duty."
If a duty to the Postmaster-General be meant, that is true;
but if a duty to the plaintiff be intended ... there was none. 5
It is most unfortunate that such an interpretation should
have been placed upon their words. In an American case, Farwell
v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Co.,6 which was decided just three
months prior to the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright,
Shaw, C.J., anticipated that case in his opinion and suggested a
result contra to the decision as it was rendered in England. He
said:
A case may be put for the purpose of illustrating this
distinction. Suppose the road had been owned by one set of
proprietors, whose duty it was to keep it in repair and have
it at all times ready and in fit condition for the running of
engines and cars, taking a toll, and that the engines and
cars were owned by another set of proprietors paying toll
to the proprietors of the road and receiving compensation
from passengers for their carriage, and suppose the engineer
suffers a loss from the negligence of the switch tender. We
are inclined to the opinion that the engineer might have a
remedy against the railroad corporation, and if so, it must
be on the ground, that as between the engineer employed by
the proprietors of the engine and cars, and the switch tender
employed by the corporation, the engineer would be a
3 Id., at 115, 11 L. J. Ex., at 418.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 4 Metc. (Mass.) 49 (1842).
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stranger between whom and the corporation there could be
no privity of contract."
Except for the fact that the switch might be regarded as real
estate (although, despite its attachment to the soil, it is essen-
tially mechanical equipment), Justice Shaw suggested a situa-
tion analogous to Winterbottom v. Wright and supposed the same
relation between plaintiff and defendant which in fact existed in
Winterbottom v. Wright, yet he suggested that recovery should
be permitted and for precisely the reason given by the judges
in the Exchequer for denying the plaintiff's right to recover.
There was other authority which might have been used to
reach a contrary conclusion. In 1773, in the famous "Squib
Case," 8 the defendant threw a lighted squib (over-sized fire-
cracker) into a large crowd. It fell near Willis, who immediately
picked it up and threw it. When it landed near Ryal, he also
threw it, the squib struck the plaintiff in the face and exploded,
putting out one of his eyes. The defense was that the injury was
caused by Ryal's act, not that of the defendant. But the court
held that the defendant was
* . . the person, who, in the present case, gave the mis-
chievous faculty to the squib. That mischievous faculty re-
mained in it till the explosion. No new power of doing
mischief was communicated to it by Willis or Ryal. It is
like the case of a mad ox turned loose in a crowd. The per-
son who turns him loose is answerable in trespass for what-
ever mischief he may do.9
Or, perhaps one could have turned to Fitzherbert, who said:
"It is the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and
truly as he aught." 10
It is strange, especially in the face of these earlier citations,
that a "holding" based solely on the policy of protecting one
group, the manufacturer, could have introduced a concept into
the law which, even today, affects many decisions in this field.
The basic inconsistency of the privity rule with the legal de-
velopment during the nineteenth century is evidenced by the
7 Id. at 61.
8 Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Black W. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773); another
report of the case appears in 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773).
9 Id. at 894, 96 Eng. Rep. at 526.
10 Fitzherbert, De Novel Natura Brevium 94D (1514), cited by Williams,
J. in Marshall v. Newcastle Ry., 11 C. B. 655, 663 (1851).
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decision in Rylands v. Fletcher." Here the court held the de-
fendant strictly liable; he had voluntarily created the risk and
therefore should bear the costs of the danger. Thus, in the space
of only a few years, the privity rule, which had led to a holding
of no liability in Winterbottom v. Wright, on the same reasoning
led the judges in Rylands v. Fletcher to create a rule of strict
liability, viz., that there was no breach of a "duty of care." 12
Almost immediately after the formation of this rule, the
courts began to whittle it away with exceptions. In 1869, an
English court held that a defendant owed a duty toward the
person who was known to him to be about to use his product
to see that it should reasonably be fit for the purpose for which
it was bought and that it had been compounded with reasonable
care, the action lying neither in warranty nor contract, but in
negligence. 13 However, this case was much criticized in England,
and it devolved upon an American court in Thomas v. Win-
chester14 to state the first of many exceptions which eventually
"swallowed the asserted general rule of nonliability, leaving
nothing upon which that rule could operate." 15 In Thomas v.
Winchester, the court held:
In the present case the sale of the poisonous article was
made to a dealer in drugs, and not to a consumer. The in-
jury therefore was not likely to fall on him, or on his ven-
dee, who was also a dealer; but much more likely to be
visited on a remote purchaser as actually happened . . .
Nothing but mischief like that which actually happened
could have been expected from sending the poison falsely
labeled into the market; and the defendant is justly re-
sponsible for the probable consequence of the act
In . . . an act of negligence imminently dangerous to the
lives of others . . . the party guilty of the negligence is
11 L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). In this case the defendant had a water reser-
voir constructed on his land. Unknown to him, the land was honeycombed
with abandoned mining shafts, some of which led into the working mine
of the plaintiff who brought suit when his mine was flooded by the water
escaping from the reservoir.
12 Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 Minn. L. R. 1,
17 (1925).
13 George v. Skivington, L. R. 5 Ex. 1 (1869). The defendant mixed a hair
rinse and sold it to the husband of the plaintiff, knowing it was to be
used by the plaintiff.
14 6 N. Y. 397 (1852). Belladonna, a poison, was mislabeled by the de-
fendant as extract of dandelion. After passing through the hands of two
druggists, it was sold to the husband for use by his wife.
15 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N. E. 2d 693, 164 A. L. R. 559, 568 (1946).
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liable to the party injured, whether there be a contract be-
tween them or not.16
Two other exceptions to the general rule evolved, and
probably others would have developed had it not been for Judge
Sanborn's summary of the exceptions in Huset v. J. I. Case
Thrashing Machine Co.: 17
The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer
or vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life and
health of mankind, and which is committed in the prepara-
tion or sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy or
affect human life is actionable by third persons who suffer
from the negligence. The second exception is that an owner's
act of negligence which causes injury to one who is invited
by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner's
premises may form the basis of an action against the owner.' s
The third exception to the rule is that one who sells or de-
livers an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous
to life or limb to another without notice of its qualities is
liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which
might have been reasonably anticipated whether there were
any contractual relations between the parties or not.19
This synthesis of the law was readily adopted since it pro-
vided convenient pegs upon which to hang a decision. But, once
again, the wording of the first exception was most unfortunate.
The cases which Judge Sanborn cited in support of this ex-
ception were either foods, 20  drugs,21 explosives, 22  or fire-
16 Thomas v. Winchester, supra n. 14, at 409.
17 120 Fed. 865, 870, 57 C. C. A. 237, 51 L. R. A. 303 (8th Cir. 1903).
18 Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883).
19 This restriction to the exception has only been applied in Windram
Manufacturing Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 57 (1921).
20 Bishop v. Webber, 139 Mass. 411 (1885). The caterer was held liable for
supplying a bad crab to a guest at a club supper which the caterer had
agreed to serve in a contract with the manager. Although no cases were
cited, the courts citing this opinion naturally included drink in the list.
21 Thomas v. Winchester, supra n. 14; Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143
(1870); Peters v. Johnson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S. E. 190 (1902). All
were cases in which a retail druggist had wrongly labelled a drug bought
from a third person or had improperly compounded such drug under a
prescription.
22 Elkins v. McKean, 79 Pa. 493 (1875). The plaintiff's declaration alleged
that the defendant, an oil refiner, had put upon the market as an illuminant,
oil "which he knew to be inflammable, explosive and unsafe" for the use
for which it was sold. This case is really authority for Judge Sanborn's
third exception rather than his first.
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arms.23 The ease with which an item could be pigeon-holed by
classifying it as a food, drink, drug, explosive or firearm led to
many arbitrary decisions.24 The manufacturers of such items as
chewing tobacco, 25 air guns,20 Coca-Cola, 27 etc., were found liable
for the negligent manufacture of their product, while manufac-
turers of elevators,28 high-powered machinery, 29 automobiles,
30
boilers,3 1 thrashing machines,32 etc., were not.
However, it remained for the opinion of Judge Cardozo in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.33 to cut through all the "verbal
niceties" of Judge Sanborn's decision and to reject once and for
all the idea that only certain classes of articles can be imminently
dangerous.
23 Dixon v. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198 (1816). The defendant was neither the
maker nor the vendor of the gun which, knowing it to be loaded, he
entrusted to a servant girl of thirteen, who in play shot the plaintiff's son.
This case lays down no rule peculiar to the maker or vendor of firearms
and seems to have been included in order to complete the list of articles
most spectacularly used to destroy human life.
24 "It would be a sad confession for a prohibitionist to admit that alcoholic
drinks are made and sold to preserve human life, but even the most ardent
of them would hesitate to say that they are made and sold with the in-
tention of destroying it." Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons
Other Than Their Immediate Vendee, 45 L. Q. 343, 356 (1929). E.g., Watson
v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S. E. 152, 1 L. R. A., N. S., 1178,
110 Am. St. Rep. 157 (1905).
25 Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918).
Contra: Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S. W.
1009 (1915).
26 Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (E. D. Mich., 1918).
Contra: Miller v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 250 Ill. App. 340 (1928).
27 Boyd v. The Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80 (1915).
28 Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 525, 231 P. 832 (1924). Cf. Tipton v.
Barnard & Lees Co., 302 Mo. 162, 257 S. W. 791 (1924).
29 Le Bourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N. E. 482 (1907).
Contra: Borsbe v. Duhokof Stove Co., 231 Mass. 466, 14 N. E. 415 (1922)
where the court held that one who turned over possession of a stove
under a conditional sale, retaining ownership of it, was liable to a person
other than his vendee for injuries received due to its defective condition
while using it in the right of the vendee.
30 Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341 (1927) 246 P. 945 (1926); Ford
Motor Co. v. Livesay, 61 Okla. 231, 160 P. 901 (1916).
31 Laudemar v. Russell & Co., 46 Ind. App. 52, 91 N. E. 822 (1910); Socony
Oil Co. v. Church, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 325 (1903) (a derrick for drilling oil
was held to be not inherently dangerous to the workmen doing the
drilling).
32 Heiser v. Steel Plant, 110 Mo. 605 (1892).




We hold, then that the principle of Thomas v. Win-
chester is not limited to poisons, explosives and things of like
nature, to things which in their normal operation are
implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such
that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its
nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected.
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that
the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract,
the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty
to make it carefully. . . There must be knowledge of a
danger, not merely possible, but probably. . . . There must
also be knowledge that in the usual course of events the
danger will be shared by others than the buyer. Such knowl-
edge may often be inferred from the nature of the trans-
action. . . . We are dealing now with the liability of the
manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the
market to be used without inspection by his customers. If
he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability
will follow ...
In such circumstances, the presence of a known danger,
attendant upon a known use, makes vigilance a duty. We
have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be fore-
seen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put
the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have
put its source in the law. 4
This case stimulated the existing tendency to impose liability
on a manufacturer. Accordingly, many courts have come to ex-
tend such liability not only to those who use the article, but
also to those who share the effects of its use,35 or are in the
vicinity of the place where it is to be used,3 6 as well as to cover
property damage 37 and even damage to the chattel itself.38 The
34 Id. at 1053-1055.
35 Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94, 195 N. W. 388 (1923).
36 Sider v. General Electric Co., 237 N. Y. 64, 143 N. E. 792 (1924).
37 Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co., 44 S. D. 421, 184 N. W. 243 (1921).
Contra: Moch v. Renssalaer Water Co., 219 App. Div. 674, 220 N. Y. Supp.
557 (3rd Dept. 1927), afid. 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928). The court
refused to impose a tort liability on a water company who had contracted
to furnish water for a community, which it did negligently, causing loss of
plaintiff's home by fire. Hinman, J., dissenting at 681, 220 N. Y. Supp., at
564 said: "The relationship of the parties in this case is such that, aside
from contract, the damage to the inhabitants is to be foreseen, and there
is a duty to avoid the injury."
38 International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F. 2d 52 (10th Cir., 1953);
Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N. Y. S. 131 (1915).
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result is that the modern tort liability of manufacturers to re-
mote consumers is based upon general principles of negligence,
i.e., a duty, based upon broad considerations of economic prin-
ciple and public policy, to use reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances to minimize foreseeable danger, irrespective of
privity. As it was so aptly put by Dean Prosser:
Cardozo's opinions struck through the fog of the "general
rule" and its various exceptions, and held the maker liable
for negligence. On its face the decision purported merely
to extend the class of "inherently dangerous" articles to in-
clude anything which would be dangerous if negligently
made. But its reasoning and fundamental philosophy was
clearly that the manufacturer, by placing the car upon the
market, assumed a responsibility to the consumer, resting
not upon the contract but upon the relation arising from
his purchase, and the foreseeability of harm if proper care
were not used. Legal writers have been quick to supply
the justification that the manufacturer derives an economic
benefit from the sale and the subsequent use of the chattel,
and his duty is analogous to that of a possessor of land
toward his business visitors; and it might be possible to add
some notion of a representation of safety in the mere act
of offering the goods for sale which, because of the original
buyer's reliance upon it, deprives the consumer of possible
protection at his hands. Such rationalization adds little, how-
ever, to the conclusion that the duty is one imposed by the
law because of affirmative conduct likely to affect the in-
terests of another. 39
Thus the consumer's problem today is not one of showing
that the goods are dangerous if negligently made, but to show
that the manufacturer actually was negligent.
Status of the Law Today
Generally speaking, the maker of an article for sale or use
by others must use reasonable care and skill not only to pre-
vent defects in it caused by unexpected mistakes in the manu-
facturing process,40 but also in designing it that it may be reason-
39 Prosser, Torts, 502-503 (2d ed. 1955).
40 Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., 190 F. 2d 825 (3rd Cir., 1951); Pierce v.
Ford Motor Co., 190 F. 2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951); Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 363
Mo. 406, 251 S. W. 2d 635 (1952).
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ably safe for the purpose for which it is intended4 ' and for other
uses which are reasonably foreseeable. 42
Most courts today place liability on the manufacturer for a
product which is "reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril," 4  but a few still speak of "inherently dangerous"
chattels.44 This rule has been extended to cover the maker of
component parts of the finished product,45 and to an assembler
of parts.46 It has even been applied to a second-hand dealer who
has reconditioned an automobile for sale.47 It also is well settled
that one who represents a product to be his own, is subject to
the same liability as if he were in fact the maker, even though
the product was manufactured by some one else.48 It has even
41 United States Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 58 F. 2d 87 (10th Cir. 1933);
Pierce v. C. H. Bidwell Thresher Co., 153 Mich. 323, 116 N. W. 1104 (1908);
Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., supra n. 35; State of Maryland for
Use and Benefit of Woodzell v. Garzell Plastics Industries, Inc., 152 F. Supp.
483 (D. C. Mich., 1957); Rogers v. White Metal Rolling and Stamping Corp.,
249 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir., 1957); Workstel v. Stern Brothers, 3 Misc. 2d 858, 156
N. Y. S. 2d 335 (1956); Gosnell v. Zink, 325 P. 2d 965 (Okla., 1958); Matthews
v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla., 1956).
42 Wolcho v. Arthur J. Rosenbluth & Co., 81 Conn. 358, 71 A. 566 (1908);
Clement v. Crosby & Co., 148 Mich. 293, 111 N. W. 745 (1907) (stove polish
intended for use on a cold stove applied to hot stove); Farley v. Edward
E. Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N. E. 639 (1930) (combs to set hair after
wet wave "before retiring" used when hair was dried by hair-drier); Love-joy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 79 N. W. 2d 688 (Minn.,
1956). Cf. Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P. 2d 807
(1947) (maker bound to anticipate contamination of product in course of
ordinary use).
43 There is a question as to whether Virginia accepts this doctrine: Robey
v. Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 192 Va. 192, 64 S. E. 2d 723 (1951).
44 Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P. 2d 481 (1934);
Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okl. 603, 35 P. 2d 916 (1934); International Derrick
and Equipment Co. v. Croix, 214 F. 2d 216 (5th Cir., 1957); Sanders v.
Clairol, Inc., 2 N. Y. App. Div. Rep. 2d 857, 155 N. Y. S. 2d 945 (1956); Day
v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N. E. 2d 231 (1956); James v.
Hilkrich & Bradsby Co., 299 S. W. 2d 92 (Ky., 1956). However this lan-
guage appears to mean nothing more than that substantial harm is to be
anticipated if the chattel should be defective.
45 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932).
46 Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P. 2d 345 (1942); C. D. Herme, Inc.
v. R. C. Tway Co., 294 S. W. 2d 534 (Ky., 1956); Markel v. Spencer, 5 N. Y.
App. Div. Rep. 2d 400, 171 N. Y. S. 2d 770 (1958); Sinatra v. National X-Ray
Products Corp., 26 N. J. 546, 141 A. 2d 28 (1958).
47 Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W. 855 (1928).
48 In the leading case a meat packer supplying canned beef under its
trade name was held liable for harm to a consumer resulting from a piece
of metal in the can, even though the beef was packed by a South American
company and there was no way for the supplier to inspect the contents of
the can. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 A. 385 (1932).
Cf. Swift & Co. v. Blackwell, 84 F. 2d 130 (4th Cir. 1936); Green v. Equitable
Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127 (W. D. Ark., 1951); Armour & Co. v.
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been suggested that this rule applies even though the defendant
has indicated that the goods were made for him by someone
else, if he fails to name the actual manufacturer. 49
While liability is still limited in the majority of jurisdictions
to products creating a risk to "life and limb," an ever-increasing
number of jurisdictions is granting recovery against the manu-
facturer for property damage.50 This is so not only where the
product causing the damage also involves undue risk of personal
injury,51 but also where no risk of harm to persons is involved,
as in the case of defective animal food.5 2 It has even been held
that there is liability where the damage is to the article itself.53
Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 191 A. 2d 572 (1939); Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton
Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N. E. 474 (1915); Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239
N. W. 611 (1931); Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Miss. 253, 164 So. 231
(1935); Wilson v. Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 208 N. Y. 108, 101 N. E. 799
(1913); Commissioner of the State Ins. Fund v. City Chemical Corp., 290
N. Y. 64, 48 N. E. 2d 262 (1943).
49 Restatement, Torts, sec. 400, comment (d) (Supp. 1948).
50 Dunn v. Ralston Purina Company, 272 S. W. 2d 479 (Tenn. App. 1954);
Williams v. Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co., 85 F. Supp. 260 (W. D. Ark.,
1949); U. S. Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, supra n. 41; Burns v. Ralston
Purina Co., 210 Ga. 82, 78 S. E. 2d 444 (1953); Dixon v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., Inc., 351 Ill. App. 75, 114 N. E. 2d 44 (1953); E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F. 2d 26 (8th Cir., 1934); Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. U. S., 69 F. Supp. 609 (D. C. Maine, 1947); Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N. W. 2d 873 (1958); Miller v.
New Zealand Insurance Co., 98 So. 2d 544 (La., 1957); Ellis v. Lindmark,
177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395 (1929); Seaton Co. v. Oil & Feed Co., 126
Mont. 415 (1952); Drainer v. R. M. Hollingshead Corp., 6 N. J. Super. 255,
71 A. 2d 139 (1950); Schuylerville Wall Paper Co., Inc. v. American Man-
ufacturing Co., 272 App. Div. 856, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (1947); Genesee County
Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263 N. Y. 463, 189 N. E.
551 (1934); Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co., supra n. 37; Theurer v.
Condon, 34 Wash. 448, 209 P. 2d 311 (1949). Cf. E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Ladner, 73 So. 2d 249 (Miss. 1954); Gosness v. Zink, 325 P. 2d 965
(Okl. 1958); Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis.
209, 240 N. W. 392 (1932); Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. C. Mass., 1956).
51 Genessee County Patrons Fire Relief Assn. v. L. Sonneborn Sons, supra
n. 50.
52 Ellis v. Lindmark, supra n. 50; Schuylerville Wallpaper Co. v. American
Mfg. Co., supra n. 50; Dunn v. Ralston Purina Company, supra n. 50; Colvin
v. John Powell & Co., 163 Neb. 112, 77 N. W. 2d 900 (1956); G. Bernd & Co.
v. Rahn, 94 Ga. App. 713, 96 S. E. 2d 185 (1956). Cf. Quaker Oats Co. v.
Davis, 33 Tenn. App. 373, 232 S. W. 2d 840 (1949).
53 "The manufacturer's duty depends not upon the results of the accident,
but upon the fact that his failure to properly construct the car resulted in
an accident... The particular class of injury should have no bearing what-
ever upon the question of liability." Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co.,
supra n. 38, 153 N. Y. S. at 133. Contra: Judson Pacific-Murphy, Inc. v.
Thew Shovel Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 828, 275 P. 2d 841 (1954); Fentress
v. Van Etta Motors, 323 P. 2d 227 (Cal. App., 1958).
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss1/5
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
However, the article must cause an actual accident, 54 for if
recovery were allowed against the manufacturer "merely because
an article with latent defects turned out to be bad when used
in 'regular service' without any accident occurring, there would
be nothing left of the citadel of privity and not much scope for
the law of warranty." 55 And a manufacturer's liability for
harm to one not in privity with him caused by the negligent
construction of his product does not extend to interference with
a contractual relationship. 56
There is no liability when the injuries were occasioned not
by negligence or defects in the manufacture of the article, but
by improper operation or use of it; 57 or where the injured person
tampered with an integral part of the machine in some manner
which the manufacturer could not reasonably foresee.58 Also,
if the article has been used for a long time, which would in-
dicate that it had been all right when manufactured and might
have weakened or deteriorated through use and handling by
various persons,5 9 or that part of the machine simply has worn
out after long use,6 0 the manufacturer is not liable. Neither is
54 A. J. P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 171 Misc. 157,
11 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (1939), aff'd. 258 App. Div. 747, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (2d
Dept. 1939), affd. 283 N. Y. 692, 98 N. E. 2d 412 (1940); Poldon Engineering
and Manufacturing Co. v. Zell Electric Manufacturing Co., 1 Misc. 2d 1016,
155 N. Y. S. 2d 115 (1957).
55 Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148
N. Y. S. 2d 284, 290 (1955).
56 Donovan Construction Co. v. General Electric Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn., 1955). Contra: Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275
(1922) (recovery for negligent conduct resulting in harm to contractual
relations was allowed due to the foreseeability that the plaintiff would be
injured).
57 Gilbride v. James Leffel & Co., 37 Ohio L. Abs. 457, 47 N. E. 2d 1015
(1942) (boiler collapsed and scalded plaintiff's decedent to death, but the
record showed that the failure was due to improper operation, and that
the collapse of the boiler was caused by the scale in it which entered it
when filling it with contaminated water); Jamieson v. Woodward and Loth-
rop, 247 F. 2d 23 (C. A. D. C., 1957); Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co.,
250 F. 2d 603 (10th Cir., 1957).
58 Borg-Warner Corp. v. Heinz, 128 F. 2d 657 (1942) (manufacturer of re-
frigerator not liable to workman working on machine who undertook to
remove a needle valve and was struck in the face by a burst of sulfur
dioxide gas from the machine).
59 Gorman v. Murphy Diesel Co., 29 A. 2d 145 (1942) (an internal com-
bustion engine which had been used by three different owners for over
sixteen months before it exploded). Cf. Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg.
Corp., 26 N. J. Super. 295, 97 A. 2d 699 (1953); Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d
228, 201 P. 2d 1 (1948).
60 "There is no duty upon the manufacturer to furnish a machine that will
not wear out. Common sense and everyday experience teaches us that
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recovery granted where the defect is known to the user 6' or it
should be quite obvious to him,62 or where the immediate buyer
is notified of the danger or discovers it for himself6 3 and resells
the goods without warning. However, where the product sold
was an extremely dangerous one, it has been held that the manu-
facturer has not been relieved of responsibility even by the
buyer's actual discovery before resale. 4 Nor is recovery barred
where the defect could have been discovered by a reasonable
inspection by the dealer or any other intervening purchaser and
where that inspection was not made. 65
machinery will wear out. The remedy remains in having the machine
inspected periodically so that worn parts may be replaced." Auld v. Sears,
R. & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 491, 493, aff'd. 288 N. Y. 515, 41
N. E. 2d 927 (1941). Cf. International Derrick & Equipment Co. v. Croix,
241 F. 2d 216 (5th Cir., 1955), cert. den. 350 U. S. 989, 76 S. Ct. 475, 100 L.
Ed. 855 (1956); Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co. v. Williams, 181 F. 2d 675
(8th Cir., 1950); Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F. 2d 359 (1st Cir., 1934);
Solomon v. White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (W. D. Pa., 1957) held that
the use of a chattel for a long period of time results in a conclusive denial
that the article was "imminently dangerous" or involved an "unreasonable
risk" of bodily harm. But, Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Company, 3
Utah 2d 354, 284 P. 2d 471 (1955) held that the passage of time is not a
factor in determining the "imminently" or "unreasonably" dangerous
character of an article and is immaterial when negligence is proved. Cf.
Kuhr Bros. v. Spahol, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S. E. 2d 491 (1954); Beadles v.
Servel, Inc., 344 IM. App. 133, 100 N. E. 2d 405 (1951).
61 Youtz v. Thompson Tire Co., 46 Cal. App. 2d 672, 116 P. 2d 636 (1941);
Gutelius v. General Electric Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P. 2d 612 (1940);
Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P. 2d 723 (1940).
62 Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1957); Campo
v. Scofield, 301 N. Y. 468, 95 N. E. 2d 902 (1950); Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N. W. 2d 853 (1948); Dempsey v. Virginia Dare
Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S. W. 2d 217 (1945); Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales
Co., 155 F. 2d 855 (5th Cir., 1946); Lewis v. Cratty, 231 Iowa 1355, 4 N. W.
2d 259 (1942); Johnson v. Murray Co., 90 S. W. 2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936). Contra: O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-Ray Co., 388 N. Y. 486, 41
N. E. 2d 177 (1942), where the court held that the fact that a defect is ob-
vious should not vitiate a duty otherwise owing to the plaintiff; the ob-
viousness of the danger should rather raise the question of plaintiff's con-
tributory fault and such a question is properly for a jury.
63 Foster v. Ford Motor Co., supra n. 30; Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 83
Tenn. 392, 192 S. W. 2d 340 (1946); Trust Co. of Chicago v. Lewis Auto Sales,
306 111. App. 132, 28 N. E. 2d 300 (1940); Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 156
Misc. 53, 280 N. Y. S. 862 (1935), affd. 248 App. Div. 713, 290 N. Y. S. 130
(1936). Cf. Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories, 335 Pa. 145, 6 A. 2d 559 (1939);
Ford Motor Co. v. Atcher, 310 S. W. 2d 510 (Ky., 1957).
64 Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S. W. 570,
39 A. L. R. 979 (1923) (gasoline mixed with kerosene); Clement v. Crosby
& Co., supra n. 42; Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., supra n. 42. Cf. Pet-
zold v. Roux Laboratories, 256 App. Div. 1096, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 565 (1939)
(inadequate warning).
65 Fredericks v. American Export Lines, 227 F. 2d 450 (2d Cir., 1953);
Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., supra n. 40; Ellis v. Lindmark, supra n. 50;




Although there is a very broad basis for liability, it is ex-
tremely difficult to prove actual negligence. "How could this be
shown of a bottler employing hundreds of people in a large plant
which turns out thousands of bottles weekly by mass produc-
tion methods? The courts have answered by allowing an in-
ference of negligence by means of the maxim res ipsa loqui-
tur." G6 The general requisites which must be found in any par-
ticular case to give rise to the use of this rule are:
(1) The accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the plaintiff. 7
Most courts 8 regard res ipsa loquitur as nothing more than
one form of circumstantial evidence.69 Justice Pitney, in fol-
lowing this view, has said: "Res ipsa loquitur, where it applies,
does not convert the defendant's general issue into an affirmative
defense. When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury
is, whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff." TO In food
66 Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Cal. L. R. 614, 636 (1955).
67 Prosser, op. cit., n. 39, at 201.
68 Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger, 44 Ariz. 174, 36 P. 2d 168 (1934);
Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P. 2d 344 (1952); Levine
v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 127 Conn. 435, 17 A. 2d 500 (1941); Dela-
ware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, 6 Terry, Del., 226, 71 A. 2d 69 (1950); Dalton
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Watkins, 70 Ga. App. 790, 29 S. E. 2d 281 (1944);
Shinofield v. Curtis, 245 Iowa 1352, 66 N. W. 2d 465 (1954); Potomac Edison
Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 152 A. 633 (1930); Liberatore v. Framingham,
315 Mass. 538, 53 N. E. 2d 861 (1944); Pattinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
353 Mich. 253, 52 N. W. 2d 688 (1952); Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
235 Minn. 471, 51 N. W. 2d 573 (1952); Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 276 S. W.
2d 95 (Mo., 1955); Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 97 N. H. 522, 92 A. 2d
658 (1952); Willdauer v. Rudnevitz, 119 N. J. L. 471, 197 A. 252 (Ct. Err. &
App., 1938); George Foltis, Inc., v. The City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 38
N. E. 2d 455 (1941); McGraw v. Southern Ky. Co., 205 N. C. 873, 175 S. E.
286 (1934); Koktavy v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 160 Ohio St. 461, 117
N. E. 2d 16 (1954); Ritchie v. Thomas, 190 Ore. 95, 224 P. 2d 543 (1950);
Motte v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 76 R. I. 349, 70 A. 2d 822 (1950); Guthrie
v. Carter, 190 Va. 354, 57 S. E. 2d 45 (1950); Wright v. Volan, 130 W. Va.
466, 43 S. E. 2d 364 (1947).
69 "When the facts and circumstances from which the jury is asked to infer
negligence are those immediately attendant upon the occurrence, we speak
of it as a case of 'res ipsa loquitur,' when not immediately connected with
the occurrence, then it is an ordinary case of circumstantial evidence."
Cullen, J. in Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925, 927, 52 L. T. A.
922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630 (1901).
70 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 240, 33 Sup. Ct. 416, 418, 57 L. Ed. 815,
Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905 (1912).
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cases, the inference of negligence created has usually been
treated as having some evidentiary weight. This was expressed
well by a Rhode Island court 7 ' as follows:
If a person is injured by a food product and he can
show, by proper probative evidence, that he bought that food
product in the original package in which it was put up by
the maker and that in that original package was a substance
which was harmful or injurious to the human body and he
shows that to the satisfaction of the jury, then a presumption
arises that the manufacturer of that food product was neg-
ligent in its manufacture. 72
Occasionally the case is of such a type that the inference of
negligence is so strong that, even though the manufacturer pro-
duced evidence of the use of the most scrupulous care in the
production of the article, he would be held liable. Thus, in
Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Co., 75 the court said: "We can imagine
no reason why, with ordinary care, human toes could not be
left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found in chewing
tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has been very careless." 74
However, where there is some possibility of tampering, such
as in the case of a removable cap of a soft-drink bottle, some
courts require the plaintiff to show affirmatively that there has
been no opportunity for tampering,75 while others have applied
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur after the introduction of evi-
dence showing the usual way in which the bottles are handled
and distributed.76 In the case of exploding bottles, it usually
71 Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R. I. 43, 144 A. 884 (1929)
(glass in ice cream).
72 Id. at 47, 48, 144 Atl. at 886. Cf. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sin-
yard, 45 Ga. App. 272, 164 S. E. 231 (1932); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Shelbyville v. Creech, 245 Ky. 414, 53 S. W. 2d 745 (1932).
73 Supra, n. 25.
74 Id. at 500, 78 So. at 366.
75 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S. W. 2d (1942);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Rowland, 16 Tenn. App. 184, 66 S. W. 2d 272
(1933); Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Utah, 218 P. 2d 660 (1950); East
Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66, 230 S. W. 2d 106 (1950);
Nichols v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 46 So. 2d 695 (La. App., 1950).
Cf. Newport News Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Babb, 190 Va. 360, 57 S. E. 2d
41 (1950); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Norfolk, Inc. v. McCullers, 189 Va. 89,
52 S. E. 2d 257 (1949).
76 Dr. Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286 (1937); Claxton Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Coleman, 68 Ga. App. 302, 22 S. E. 2d 768 (1942); Duval
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 329 Ill. App. 290, 68 N. E. 2d 479(1946); Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Evansville, Inc. v. Williams, 111 Ind.
App. 502, 37 N. E. 2d 702 (1941); Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.
v. Reed, 312 Ky. 731, 229 S. W. 2d 438 (1950); Seale v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Works of Lexington, 297 Ky. 450, 179 S. W. 2d 598 (1944); Underhill v.
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is necessary to show that each person who had the control of
the bottle handled it properly.77
The products liability cases seem to have led to a marked
relaxing in the requirement of exclusive control in the applica-
tion of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.7s It has even been sug-
gested that it has been so liberally applied in products cases that
the courts are in effect imposing liability without fault.79 Others
have said that the frequent use of the doctrine is a "thinly con-
cealed circumvention of the theory of absolute liability," 80 or an
"imposition of strict liability under cover of a fiction of neg-
ligence." 81
However, even with all this relaxation of the requirements,
it is still necessary to prove causal connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm. In a federal case in-
volving a shampoo s 2 the plaintiff only showed that after its use
her scalp became irritated, and that shortly thereafter her hair
fell from her scalp, eyebrows and eyelashes, and that after a
year the hair from her entire body fell out. Her experts, who
analyzed the shampoo, testified that it did not contain excessive
alkalinity. Three specialists in dermatology, called by the de-
Anciaux, 226 P. 2d 794 (1951); Beaumont Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Guillot,
222 S. W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App., 1949); Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Wimberley, 108 S. W. 2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). But, in Texas & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U. S. 468, 470, 23 S. Ct. 622, 57 L. Ed 905 (1903),
Justice Holmes said: "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought
to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it is usually complied with or not." Cf. Trembley v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 285 App. Div. 539, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 332 (3d Dept., 1955);
Saglimbeni v. West End Brewing Co., 274 App. Div. 201, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 635(3d Dept., 1948).
77 Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 2d 674, 129 P. 2d 485 (1942); Miami Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Reisinger, 68 Sp. 2d 589 (Fla., 1953); Dunn v. Hoffman
Beverage Co, 126 N. J. L. 556, 20 A. 2d 352 (1941); Hankins v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 151 Tex. 303, 249 S. W. 2d 1008 (1952); Bernstein v. Metro-
politan Bottling Co., 45 N. J. Super. 365, 132 A. 2d 825 (1957); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, Inc. v. Crow, 291 S. W. 2d 589 (Tenn., 1956).
78 Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317 (1953) (all persons handling
bottle before it exploded joined as defendants); Loch v. Confari, 372 Pa.
212, 93 A. 2d 451 (1953) (both bottler and retailer joined). Contra: Burr v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954).
79 Peairs, The God in the Machine-A Study in Precedent, 29 B. U. L. Rev.
37, 64 (1949).
80 Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. R. 359,
381 (1951).
81 Dickerson, Products Liability and the Food Consumer 132 (1951).
82 J. R. Watkins Co. v. Raymond, 184 F. 2d 925 (8th Cir., 1950). Cf. Karr
v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N. Y. 360, 160 N. E. 398 (1928); Bish v. Employers Lia-
bility Assurance Corp., Ltd., 236 F. 2d (5th Cir., 1956).
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
ADVERTISED PRODUCTS-MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY 29
fendant, stated the shampoo did not cause plaintiff's condition.
The court said:
This testimony shows no causal connection between the
use of the shampoo and the resulting falling out of the
plaintiff's hair. The mere suffering of the illness did not
tend to prove that the shampoo was poisonous or infectious.8 3
And, of course, the defendant still has the defenses of con-
tributory negligences4 and assumption of risk.8 5
Violation of statute as negligence per se.
If a defendant violates a statute designed to protect individ-
uals against harm from a particular source, and the harm con-
templated by the statute occurs on account of the violation,
liability may result, even where the statute itself provides no
civil remedy.8, Although some courts hold that violation of a
statute is merely evidence of negligence, 7 the prevailing view
is that the breach of the statutory provisions is negligence in
itself, without regard to actual negligence or willfulness.
8 8
Most of the cases have arisen under the law regarding the
manufacturer and safety of food and drugs, since virtually all
states have comprehensive laws regulating the manufacture and
sale of adulterated and mis-branded food and drugs.8 9 Liability
based on violation of these statutes has been held to be as far
reaching as liability on actual negligence; thus lack of privity of
contract with a remote consumer is no bar to recoveryfs0 Similar
83 J. R. Watkins Co. v. Raymond, supra, n. 82 at 928.
84 Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Co., supra, n. 61; Sitta v. American Steel and
Wire Division of United States Steel Corp., 245 F. 2d 12 (6th Cir., 1958).
85 Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P. 2d 100 (1936); Oettinger
v. Norton Co., 160 F. Supp. 399 (D. C. Pa., 1957).
86 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 482, 60 L. Ed. 874
(1916).
87 Jones v. Co-operative Ass'n., 109 Me. 448, 84 A. 985 (1912); Guinan v.
Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N. E. 235 (1929); Evers v.
Davis, 86 N. J. L. 196, 90 A. 677 (1914); Clark v. Boston & Me. R. R., 64
N. H. 323, 10 A. 676 (1897).
88 Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920); Larkins v. Kohl-
meyer, 229 Ind. 391, 98 N. E. 2d 896 (1951); Schell v. Du Bois, 94 Ohio St.
93, 113 N. E. 664, L. R. A. 1917A, 710 (1916); Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291,
205 N. W. 128 (1925).
89 Salthe, State Food, Drug and Cosmetic Legislation and Its Administra-
tion, 6 Law. & Contemp. Prob. 165, 167 (1939).
90 Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 2d 861, 15 S. E. 2d 136
(1948); Kelly v. John R. Dailey Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919); Portage
v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N. Y. 458, 15 N. E. 309 (1926).
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss1/5
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
holdings have resulted from violations of legislation designed to
insure the purity of animal food.91
The other principal statutes which have given rise to liability
of this type are ones forbidding the sale of kerosene which has a
flash point lower than a specified minimum temperature, 92 legis-
lation relating to insecticides, fungicides and rodenticides,9 3 and




It has been said of warranty that, "A more notable example
of legal miscegenation could hardly be cited." 96 For, in its in-
ception, breach of warranty was a tort.97 How remote the action
was from an action of contract appears plainly from a remark of
Coke, J.: "If one sells a thing to me, and another warrants it to
be good and sufficient, upon that warranty made by parol, I shall
not have an action of deceit; but if it was by deed, I shall have
an action of covenant." 9 8 In Cross v. Gardner,99 Lord Holt
largely fixed the law of express warranty in its modem form.
He held that an affirmation of title in the seller, though not known
91 Pinegrove Poultry Farm, Inc., v. Newton By-Products Manufacturing
Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E. 84 (1928); White v. Rose, 241 F. 2d 94 (10th
Cir., 1957).
92 General Oil Co. v. Crowe, 54 Ga. App. 302, 53 S. E. 2d 761 (1936).
93 McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S. E.
2d 712 (1953).
94 Peterron v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Ore. 511, 106 P. 337 (1910).
95 See also: Skeel, Product Warranty Liability, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 94 (1957);
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Col.
L. R. 653 (1957); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality,
27 Minn. L. R. 117 (1943); Sprill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Re-
covery on Warranty, 19 N. C. L. R. 551 (1941); Llewellyn, On Warranty of
Quality & Society, 36 Col. L. R. 699 (1936), 37 Col. L. R. 341, 408 (1937);
Schneider, Effect of Advertising on the Manufacturer's Liability, 22 Wash.
U. L. Q. 406 (1937); Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or
Warranty, 42 Harv. L. R. 886 (1927); Williston, Liability for Honest Mis-
representation, 24 Harv. L. R. 415 (1911); Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2
Harv. L. R. 1 (1888).
96 Note, 42 Harv. L. R. 414 (1929).
97 The earliest reported case is Fitz. Ab. Monst. de Faits, pl. 160 (1383).
98 Y. B. 11 Ed. IV, 6, pl. 11; see also Moor v. Russell, 2 Show. 284 (1690) in
which the court held that there need be no allusion to consideration, and
that if it was alleged, it counted for nothing.
99 1 Show. 68, Carthew 90, 3 Mod. Rep. 261 (1689). Cf. Medina v. Stough-
ton, 1 Ld. Raym. 593, 1 Salk. 210 (1700); Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446
(1802).
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to be false and though not put in the form of a warranty or ex-
press promise, was ground for liability. This action was still in
tort, and as late as 1797, one finds Lord Kenyon talking of breach
of warranty as a form of "fraud." 100
It was in Stuart v. Wilkins'0 ' that the further step was taken
of allowing the action of assumpsit for the enforcement of an
express warranty. It would appear that there was an unreported
discussion in this case as to whether this would also apply to an
implied warranty, but that Lord Mansfield felt that this was still
exclusively a matter of tort.10 2 Shortly thereafter, in the leading
case of Gardiner v. Gray,10 3 Lord Ellenborough stated the funda-
mental principle of the implied warranty of merchantable
quality:
I am of opinion, however, that under such circum-
stances, the purchaser has a right to expect a saleable ar-
ticle answering the description in the contract. Without any
particular warranty, this is an implied term in every such
contract. Where there is no opportunity to inspect the com-
modity, the maxim of caveat emptor does not apply. He
cannot without a warranty insist that it shall be of any par-
ticular quality or fineness, but the intention of both parties
must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the market
under the denomination mentioned in the contract between
them. The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to
lay them on a dunghill. The question then is, whether the
commodity purchased by the plaintiff be of such a quality
as can reasonably be brought into the market to be sold ...
under that denomination. 10 4
Thus the elements of scienter and reliance, as required by
Derry v. Peek'0 5 for an action in deceit, were no longer neces-
sary. Instead, the only thing considered was the intent of the
parties.
After this decision, the law was rapidly rounded out by
other cases. The seller's warranty was held to mean not only
that the goods delivered must be genuine according to the name,
100 Jendwine v. Slade, 2 Esp. 572 (1797).
101 1 Douglas 18 (1778). It would appear from the language used that this
form of pleading had been recognized somewhat earlier. Prosser in The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. R. 117, 119 (1943)
placed the date as c. 1750.
102 Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (1802) in which this
discussion was mentioned.
103 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
104 Id. at 145. Cf. Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194
(1813); Laing v. Fidgeon, 6 Taunt. 108, 4 Camp. 169, 128 Eng. Rep. 974 (1815).
105 14 A. C. 337, 58 L. J. Ch. 864 (1889).
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kind or description specified, 10 but that they must be of a
quality to pass in the market under that description, 107 and be
reasonably fit for the ordinary uses to which such goods are
put. 08 It was recognized as a dealer's warranty only 0 9 for which
trade usage had to be taken into account." 0 The implied war-
ranty of fitness for the buyer's particular purpose developed as
something separate and distinct from that of merchantable
quality."' Finally, in Jones v. Just,112 the whole matter was
summed up as follows:
First, where goods are in esse, and may be inspected by
the buyer, and there is no fraud on the part of the seller, the
maxim caveat emptor applies, even though the defect which
exists in them is latent, and not discoverable on examina-
tion, at least where the seller is neither the grower nor the
manufacturer..
Secondly, where there is a sale of a definite existing
chattel specifically described, the actual condition of which
is capable of being ascertained by either party, there is no
implied warranty....
Thirdly, where a known described and defined article
is ordered of a manufacturer, although it is stated to be re-
quired by the purchaser for a particular purpose, still if the
known, described and defined thing be actually supplied,
there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular pur-
pose intended by the buyer.
Fourthly, where a manufacturer or a dealer contracts
to supply an article which he manufactures or produces, or
in which he deals, to be applied to a particular purpose, so
that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or skill of
the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that case an implied
term or warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for the pur-
pose to which it is to be applied....
Fifthly, where a manufacturer undertakes to supply
goods manufactured by himself, or in which he deals, but
which the vendee has not had the opportunity of inspecting,
106 Bridge v. Wain, 1 Stark 504, 171 Eng. Rep. 543 (1816); Nichols v. Godts,
10 Exch. 191, 23 L. J. Ex. 314 (1854); Allan v. Lake, 18 Q. B. 560, 118 Eng.
Rep. 212 (1852).
107 Wieler v. Schilizzi, 17 C. B. 614, 189 Eng. Rep. 1219 (1856); Josling v.
Kingsford, 13 C. B. (N S.) 444, 32 L. J. C. P. 94, 143 Eng. Rep. 177 (1856).
108 Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (1829); Beer v. Walker,
46 L. J. Q. B. 677, 34 L. T. 278 (1877).
109 Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644, 153 Eng. 1548 (1847). Cf. La
Neuville v. Nourse, 3 Camp. 351, 170 Eng. Rep. 1407 (1813).
110 Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Ald. 240, 106 Eng. Rep. 1180 (1821); Frith v.
Mitchell, 4 F. & F. 464 (1865).
Ill Jones v. Bright, supra n. 108; Randall v. Newson, 2 Q. B. D. 102 (1877).
112 L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 9 B. & S. 141, 37 L. J. Q. B. 89 (1868).
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it is an implied term in the contract that he shall supply a
merchantable article.11 3
It was about this time that the idea appeared that warranties
arose by implication of law from what had been said and done,
and were independent of any intent on the part of the seller to
contract with regard to them, or to be bound by them.114 This
concept, readily accepted with regard to express warranties, 15
was equally rapidly applied to those "implied" for reason of
public policy. Thus, it has often been said that implied war-
ranties of quality arise by operation of law and are independent
of any intention to agree upon their terms as a matter of fact;"
6
and there are many cases in which to hold that the warranty is
a term of the contract is "to speak the language of pure fic-
tion." 117
Status of the Law Today
The common law of the past century was codified in the
Sale of Goods Act"" and the Uniform Sales Act. 1 19 Since, at
that time, the rule as to the necessity of privity seemed almost
axiomatic, no provision was made to extend liability on war-
ranty to a subvendee.1 20 However, it seems clear that neither act
was intended to exclude such liability.'
2
'
113 Id., Q. B. 202-203.
114 Prosser, op. cit., n. 101, at 121-122.
115 Kenner v. Harding, 85 Ill. 264, 28 Am. Rep. 615 (1877); McClintock v.
Emick, Stoner & Co., 87 Ky. 160, 7 S. W. 903, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 995 (1888); Fair-
bank Canning Co. v. Metzger, 118 N. Y. 260, 23 N. E. 372 (1890); Herron v.
Dibrell, 87 Va. 289, 12 S. E. 674 (1891); Hobart v. Young, 63 Vt. 363, 21 A.
612, 12 L. R. A. 693 (1891); Ingraham v. Union R. Co., 19 R. I. 356, 33 A.
875 (1896).
116 Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790, 59 A. L. R. 1164 (1927);
Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163 (1860); Lee v. Cohrt, 57
S. D. 387, 232 N. W. 900 (1930); Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, 169 Misc.
879, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (1939); Little v. G. E. Van Syckle & Co., 115 Mich.
480, 73 N. W. 554 (1898); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Wirtz Bros., 15 N. D. 477,
107 N. W. 1078 (1906).




120 Section 76 of the Uniform Sales Act defines "buyer" thus: "Buyer means
a person who buys or agrees to buy goods or any legal successor in interest
of such person." It would seem that this definition might have been used
as an instrument for extending the rights of subvendees and donees, but it
has not been so used. See also Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, 70 App. D. C.
398, 107 F. 2d 203 (1939).
121 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939). See
also Note, 42 Harv. L. R., op. cit., n. 96, at 415.
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Nevertheless, most courts still insist that warranty is a con-
tractual obligation 122 and that there can be no breach of war-
ranty where there is no privity of contract.12' As Professor
Gillam wrote in a recent article:
Doubtless the decisions of these courts are bottomed on
conceptions of sound economic policy, but the fact that
nothing more substantial than a historical accident explains
the contractual character of an action for breach of war-
ranty affords logical justification for reaffirmation of the tort
basis of waranty, and to recognize the tort basis of war-
ranty is to abandon privity of contract as an essential ele-
ment of an action for breach of warranty. 124
Although a few well-known writers have opposed removal
of the privity requirement, particularly with reference to general
products, 25 the majority over the past twenty-five years have
122 Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S. W. 40 (1919); Senter v.
B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo., 1954); Delgaudio v. Ingerson,
19 Conn. Supp. 151, 110 A. 2d 626 (1954); Coca-Cola Bottling Works of
Evansville v. Williams, 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N. E. 2d 702 (1941); Lajoie v.
Bilodeau, 148 Me. 59, 93 A. 2d 719 (1953); Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Ellin, 195 Md. 663, 75 A. 2d 116 (1950); Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
109 Mont. 213, 95 P. 2d 443 (1939); Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N. H.
97, 25 A. 2d 125 (1942); Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 112 A. 2d
701 (R. I. 1955); Jordan v. Coca-Cola Co. of Utah, 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d
660 (1950); Holley v. Baking Co., 128 W. Va. 531, 37 S. E. 2d 729 (1946);
Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc., 261 Wis. 584, 53 N. W. 2d 788 (1952);
Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 57 F. 2d 447 (D. C. Cir., 1932).
No warranty, but prima facie case in negligence: Seale v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 297 Ky. 450, 179 S. W. 2d 598 (1944); Johnson v. Stoddary,
310 Mass. 232, 37 N. E. 2d 505 (1941); Alston v. J. L. Prescott Co., 10 N. J.
Super. 116, 76 A. 2d 686 (1950); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N. Y. 468, 139
N. E. 576 (1923); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158
S. W. 2d 721 (1942); Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Land, 189 Va.
35, 52 S. E. 2d 85 (1949).
Warranty approved in dicta but case decided on negligence: Underhill
v. Anciaux, 68 Nev. 69, 226 P. 2d 794 (1951); Studebaker v. Nail, 82 Ga. App.
779, S. E. 2d 198 (1950).
Warranty on label only: Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10,
54 N. W. 2d 769 (1952); Simpson v. Oil Co., 217 N. C. 542, 8 S. E. 2d 813
(1940); Whitehorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S. D. 465, 293 N. W. 859 (1940).
Warranty accepted in language of courts but restricted by all the de-
fenses available in action for negligence: Magic City Bottling Co. v. Tol-
bert, 34 Ala. App. 516, 41 So. 2d 619 (1949); Southwestern Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Northern, 65 Ariz. 172, 177 P. 2d 219 (1947); Dobrenski v.
Blatz Brewing Co., 41 F. Supp. 291 (W. D. Mich., 1941).
123 "To sustain a finding that there was a breach of warranty, express or
implied, there must have been evidence of a contract between the parties,
for without a contract there could be no warranty." Welshausen v. Charles
Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 233, 76 A. 271, 273 (1910).
124 Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. R. 119, 148 (1958).
125 Pound, New Paths of the Law, 39-40 (1940); Williston, Sales, 244 (Rev.
ed., 1948) (stating that the imposition of liability to remove consumers and
users "seems somewhat severe"); Leidy, Another New Tort, 38 Mich. L. R.
964, 986 (1940); Peairs, The God in the Machine-A Study in Precedent, 29
B. U. L. Rev. 37, 76-78 (1949).
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been clearly in favor of discarding this concept as a basis for
imposition of liability. 12 6 This has clearly become a basic prob-
lem of social policy as well as one of law.
It was in the food cases that strict liability, i.e., warranty
liability without privity of contract, was first imposed. As
Llewellyn has pointed out, "The emotional drive and appeal of
the cases centers in the stomach." 127 A large minority of juris-
dictions 128 disregard the requirement of privity of contract, or
avoid it by means of some legal fiction. Some of the means used
by the minority courts to arrive at the end of liability:
(1) In some jurisdictions the privity rule is repudiated as
contrary to public policy.
129
(2) It has been held that the manufacturer's warranty to
the retailer inures to the consumer's benefit. 130
(3) Some courts have simply brushed it aside or ignored
it.1 3 1
126 Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Calif. L. R. 614, 640-649 (1955); Dickerson,
Products Liability and the Food Consumer, 134, 142, 277 (1951); Miller,
Liability of a Manufacturer for Harm Done by a Product, 3 Syracuse L. R.
106, 118-119 (1951); Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requirement for Re-
covery on Warranty, 19 N. C. L. Rev. 551, 565-566 (1941); Feezer, Manufac-
turer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products, 37 Mich. L. R. 1, 24
(1938); Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 24 Va. L. R. 134, 157 (1937); Llewellyn, Warranty of
Quality and Society, 36 Col. L. R. 699, 704 (1936); Llewellyn, Cases on Sales
341 (1930); Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability, 5 Iowa
L. Bull. 86, 95 (1920).
127 Llewellyn, Cases on Sales 342 (1930).
128 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra, n. 121; Florida Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla., 1953); Williams v. Paducah
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N. E. 2d 164 (1951); Anderson
v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N. W. 48 (1937); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613,
258 P. 2d 317 (1953); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La.
919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721,
186 So. 628 (1939); Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S. W. 2d 150 (Mo.
App. 1942); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 105 Ohio App. 53 (1957),
aff'd. 167 Ohio St. 244, 4 Ohio Opinions 2d 291, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958); Ada
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Asbury, 206 Okla. 269, 242 P. 2d 417 (1952); Lock
v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A. 2d 24 (1949); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 164 S. W. 2d 828 (1942); Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162
P. 2d 801 (1945); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Torres, 255 F.
2d 149 (1st Cir., 1958).
129 "Liability in such case is not based on negligence, nor on a breach of
the usual implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principle of the
public policy to protect human health and life." Jacob E. Decker & Sons
v. Capps, supra, n. 130 at 829.
130 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra, n. 121; Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094 (1957).
131 Parish v. Great A&P Tea Co., N. Y. Mun. Ct. (June 29, 1958); Rainwater
v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1922);
Holyfield v. Joplin Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 S. W. 2d 451 (Mo. App.
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(4) Other courts have said that the warranty between the
parties to the original sale "runs with the goods or with the
title." 132
(5) Another approach is to find that there is a third party
beneficiary contract between the manufacturer and his vendee
in favor of the consumer. 1
33
(6) Also there may be a theoretical assignment by the
dealer of the producer's warranty. 34
(7) Still others avoid the privity rule by finding that the
retailer is the consumer's agent to buy 135 or that he is the manu-
facturer's agent to sell.136
(8) In like manner, the actual buyer has been held to be
an agent to purchase for the consumer. 137
(9) In some cases the maker was said to have represented
the goods to be suitable by placing them on the market.138
(10) Sometimes warranty is confused with negligence. 139
1943); Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Loudder, 207 S. W. 2d 632
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105
P. 2d 76 (1940). In an interesting case in Mississippi, the court found neither
negligence nor warranty, but just a mouse in a bottle of Coca-Cola bought
from a retailer and bottled by the defendant, the court said: "A sma'
mousee caused the trouble in this case. The wee, sleekit, cow'rin, tim'rous
beastie drowned in a bottle of coca-cola." And appellee "did not get joy
from the refreshing drink. He was in the frame of mind to approve the
poet's words:
The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft aglay
An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain,
For promis'd joy."
Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914).
132 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927);
Dothan Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 639, 80 So. 734
(1918).
133 Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928).
134 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S. W. 2d 445 (1936).
'35 Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 P. 1050 (1929).
136 Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F. 2d 391 (2d Cir., 1932).
137 Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785, L. R. A. 1916D, 1006(1916); Colby v. First Nat. Stores, 307 Mass. 252, 29 N. E. 2d 920 (1940);
Brussel v. Grand Union Co., 14 N. J. Misc. 751, 187 Atl. 582 (1936).
138 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382, 17 A. L. R.
649 (1920); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 48 L. R. A.,
N. S. 213, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 140 (1913); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works
of Pittsburgh, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
139 Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924); Ward v.
Morehead Sea Food Co., 171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916).
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(11) A few courts consider food cases as a special excep-
tion to the rule.140
(12) Other courts have based liability on the advertising
or labeling of the products. These cases will be discussed later
in this article.
It seems likely that the public policy in favor of protecting
food consumers is the basic consideration back of all the deci-
sions which impose strict liability. It has been suggested in this
connection that:
* * * courts wanting to dispose of the privity requirement
for reasons of policy will sound technically more convinc-
ing if they eschew such feeble fictions as third-party benefi-
ciaries and warranties running with the goods. They would
better direct their energies toward examining the historical,
legal and social justifications for imposing such a require-
ment and, if fictions are helpful, adopt assumptions better
suited to their purpose. 4'
Even the majority of those courts, which recognize strict
liability without privity of contract as to food, have refused to
extend it to any other type of products. However, there have
been a few decisions extending the manufacturer's strict liability
to animal food,142 soap,'143 a grinding wheel, 144 a dangerous crop-
dusting compound likely to drift,14 5 hair dye, 146 and possibly to a
140 Hertzler v. Manshum, supra n. 159; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., supra n.
138.
141 Dickerson, op. cit., n. 126, at 99; see also Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 169
N. Y. S. 2d 313 (1957).
142 McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S. D. Cal., 1954); International
Milling Co. v. Jernigan, 191 S. W. 2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Contra:
Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc., supra n. 122.
143 Krupar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N. E. 2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N. E. 2d 7 (1954); Worley v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 253 S. W. 2d 532 (Mo. App. 1952).
144 DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 102 N. E. 2d 289 (Ohio 1951). Contra:
Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N. E. 2d 8, 9 (1953) (a
defective electric blanket causing house to burn down) in which the court
said: "Although a sub-purchaser of an inherently dangerous article may
recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing
of the article, causing harm to the sub-purchaser or his property from a
latent defect therein, no action may be maintained against such manu-
facturer by such sub-purchaser for such harm, based upon implied war-
ranty of fitness of the article so purchased."
145 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S. W. 2d 820 (1949).
Contra: Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041 (1954)
(privity of contract is required in an action for a breach of either express
or implied warranty).
146 Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P. 2d 413 (1954).
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beverage bottle,'147 and a shampoo.1 48 In a few cases there has
been a strained attempt to find an agency relationship,'149 but in
the discussion of one of them, Freeman v. Navarre,150 the court
said:
While the decision [McAfee v. Cargill, Inc.151] speaks in
terms of the extension of an exception, the rule of privity
of contract-at least in the field of food, whether for human
or animal consumption-seems to have been so emasculated
that little is left except vestigial remains. Since the McAfee
case was concerned with an injury to a chattel [a prize dog],
it is interesting to speculate where the line between the rule
of privity and the "exceptions" to it is to be drawn. Would
the distinction be made on the basis of whether the chattel is
a living animal or an inanimate object? The case simply il-
lustrates the trend farther away from the rule of privity in
warranty cases. With this in mind, and with some emphasis
upon the well-known principle that the courts do not favor
a multiplicity of law suits, it appears that a realistic, judicial
analysis and re-appraisal of the privity rule would be quite
appropriate. 15 2
Thus it appears that this court would agree with Prosser
when he wrote: "If the producer is to be required to guarantee
his product, no further justification will be needed than that
public opinion will have arrived at the point where it places full
responsibility for the injury upon him." 153 It is "only by some
violent pounding and twisting" 154 that warranty can be made to
yield the desired result.
147 Nichols v. Nold, supra n. 128, 258 P. 2d at 323, in which the warranty
count was interpreted as pertaining "to the bottle as well as to the con-
tents," the court saying that it was not "greatly concerned about the
privity of contract. Each of the defendants intended the bottle of Pepsi-
Cola to be sold and it was alleged in the petition that it was sold." Contra:
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 10 P. 2d 436
(1944); Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okl. 302, 193 P. 2d
575, 4 A. L. R. 2d 458 (1948); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Butler, 186 S. W. 2d
996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
148 Raymond v. J. R. Watkins Co., 88 F. Supp. 932, 934 (Minn., 1950), the
court saying, in dicta, "Whether the sale is made directly to a particular
purchaser, or to an agent of such purchaser, or to the public generally, it
seems to the writer of this opinion that the applicable law attaches to the
sale and the consequences of the manufacturer's conduct, irrespective of
what is termed privity of contract."
149 Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., supra n. 136; Hall Manu-
facturing Co. v. Purcell, 199 Ky. 375, 251 S. W. 177 (1923); Wisdom v.
Morris Hardware Co., supra n. 135.
150 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P. 2d 1015 (1955).
151 Supra n. 142.
152 Freeman v. Navarre, supra n. 150, 289 P. 2d at 1018.
13 Prosser, Torts, 511 (2d ed. 1955).
154 Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks through Legal Devices,
24 Col. L. Rev. 335, 358 (1924).
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Advertising.
Perhaps the most logical attempts at removing the necessity
for privity of contract are the so-called "advertising and labeling
cases." Williston, 155 after acknowledging the fact that warranty
is today considered to be contractual, and that "there can be no
doubt but that the seller may expressly promise to be answerable
for some alleged quality of the articles sold, or that if he makes
a promise for good consideration, he enters into a contract," goes
on to say that:
This, however, does not either upon authority or reason
exhaust the possibilities of express warranties. It should
not be the law, and by the weight of modern authority, it is
not the law that a seller who by positive affirmation induces a
buyer to enter into a bargain can escape from liability by
convincing the court that his affirmation was not an offer to
contract. A positive representation of fact is enough to render
him liable. The distinction between warranty and represen-
tation which is important in some branches of the law is not
appropriate here. The representation of fact which induces
a bargain is a warranty.'5 6
And later on he writes:
If it be granted that a sub-purchaser as such is not en-
titled to the benefit of a warranty given to the original buyer,
it yet may be asked may not the original seller by means of
labels, advertisements or otherwise, bind himself by a war-
ranty to anyone who thereafter buys his goods. Certainly
manufacturers often make representations to the public,
which if made directly to an immediate buyer, would amount
to warranties ... A warranty is in many cases imposed by a
law not in accordance with the intention of the parties; and
in its origin was enforced in an action sounding in tort, based
on the plaintiff's reliance on deceitful appearances or repre-
sentations, rather than on a promise ... It must be admitted,
however, that most courts might require the existence of a
direct contractual relation. This relation, however, might
under some circumstances exist between manufacturer and
a consumer who is neither a purchaser nor a sub-pur-
chaser.157
These remarks by Williston were incorporated in an article
by Professor Spruill, who then went on to say:
1r5 1 Williston, Sales (Rev. ed., 1948).
156 Id. at 197.
157 Id. at 244a.
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What is important is that statements are made by one
who professes a reasonable certainty of knowledge, or whose
position makes accurate information peculiarly available to
him. Not only parties to the contract itself, but those in-
terested in and closely connected with the subject matter
who, because of such connection, are in a position to furnish
accurate information, or who purport to impart it, may well
be held to answer here for even innocent information. There
are situations in which action is commonly taken in business
negotiations upon the assumed existence of certain facts.
Business proceeds not upon the assumption that representa-
tions are merely honestly and cautiously made, but that they
are true. As applied to the problem under consideration this
principle might be stated thus: One in, or apparently in, a
position to know, who, actuated by self-interest, makes a
representation intended to induce, and reasonably inducing
another to purchase or to use goods, is an insurer of the truth
of the matter so represented. 5 8
Judge Skeel, 159 in an article discussing his opinion in the
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent'10 case, wrote:
The representation made by a manufacturer seeking to
induce the use of his product (where because of economic
reasons he must sell his product through a distributor or re-
tailer) and where such ultimate consumer relies on his repre-
sentation as the inducing cause of the purchase, amounts to a
warranty in favor of the ultimate consumer. Certainly the
corner drug store or other retailer of . . . Permanent Wave
could have no use for such product, nor would he be induced
to buy it because of such representations of the advantage to
be gained by its use, except as the ultimate consumer may, in
response to the manufacturer's representations, demand the
product. But the... Home Permanent Company, in inducing
through direct advertising the use of its product by the ulti-
mate consumer, does so for its own benefit. It is only second-
arily interested in the retailer as a channel through which
the product is made available to the public responding to the
demand which its advertising creates. 6 1
And later on he continues:
Where a manufacturer induces the purchase of his prod-
ucts by an ultimate consumer by representations as to their
quality, purposes and uses, which are relied on by the pur-
chaser, and where such representations are untrue, so that
the purchaser is damaged in using the product for the pur-
158 Spruill, op. cit., n. 126, at 557.
159 Skeel, Product Warranty Liability, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 94 (1957).
160 Supra n. 128; see also Markovich v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 149
N. E. 2d 181 (Ohio App., 1958).
161 Skeel, op. cit., n. 159, at 105.
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pose as advertised, the common law theory of express war-
ranty should be available to the purchaser regardless of
privity. If this is not true, then where the dealer sells at the
request of the buyer without express warranty.., then even
though the plaintiff was injured because the product did not
square with the representations that induced the sale, he
would be without a remedy if unable to prove fault in the
process of manufacture .... 112
Probably the leading case in support of this view is Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co.,16 3 in which the plaintiff lost an eye when a
pebble struck the windshield on his car causing a piece of glass
to fly into it. The sales literature had contained the statement,
"All of the new Fords have a triplex shatter-proof glass wind-
shield, so made that it will not fly or shatter under the hardest
impact. This is an important safety factor because it eliminates
the danger of flying glass, the cause of most of the injuries in
automobile accidents." The court found that the plaintiff had a
right to rely on the representations made by the Ford Motor
Company in its sales literature "even though there was no privity
of contract." 164 In a second opinion, after a new trial, the court
seemed to emphasize misrepresentation rather than warranty, re-
marking that "the falsity of the misrepresentations could not
readily be detected" and concluding that "where a person states
as true material facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies
and acts thereon to his injury, if the representations are false,
it is immaterial that he did not know that they were false or that
he believed them to be true." 165
In two subsequent automobile windshield advertising cases,
the plaintiffs failed to recover. In the first, Chanin v. Chevrolet
Motor Company,166 the windshield was advertised as "shatter-
proof," yet the plaintiff was injured by flying glass. The court
held that no action of warranty would lie in favor of a remote
162 Id. at 114.
163 168 Wash. 459, 12 P. 2d (409) (1932); second opinion, 179 Wash. 123, 35
P. 2d 1090 (1934).
164 Id., 12 P. 2d, at 412.
165 Id., 35 P. 2d, at 1092. In a later Washington case, the court denied re-
covery for property damage resulting from the installation of a defective
furnace which had been sold to the contractor from whom the plaintiff had
purchased his house. This court said that there could be no recovery on
grounds of breach of warranty in the absence of privity of contract, and
that the Baxter decision was based on fraud. Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal
Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P. 2d 642 (1946).
166 89 F. 2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937).
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purchaser and that an action in deceit would require allegations
of conscious misrepresentation. They refused to consider the
possibility that extensive advertising had brought about a con-
tractual relation for the reason that it was not sufficiently alleged
in the complaint. In the other case, Rachlin v. Libby Owens Ford
Glass Co.,167 the manufacturer had described the windshield as
"safety glass," contrasting it with ordinary glass which "breaks
into jagged, dangerous, razor-edged chunks that fly through the
air." The windshield shattered when the car was run into by
another car, but the court held that the words did not amount
to a representation that the glass was unbreakable, or that no
possible type of collision could "cause it to fly about in dangerous
fragments."
In a later case, Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 168 the
manufacturer's advertising emphasized that the car was "a rugged
fortress of safety," improved with a seamless steel roof making it
a "smooth, solid unit with the body shell" with "no seams or
joints in the roof." The plaintiff negligently ran his car off the
road, overturning it, and injuring his head on a seam welding
the two halves of the roof together. The court held that con-
tributory negligence was no defense, and he was allowed to re-
cover against the manufacturer. The court stating:
Whether the result is best justified by holding the
privity concept inapplicable because of its historical origins
• . . or that the requirements of privity are satisfied by the
commercial advertising and merchandising methods of the
defendant, or by finding the dealer under the circumstances
defendant's agent to warrant its products .... or by holding
that the express warranty is similar to a covenant running
with the land and follows the product to the ultimate con-
sumer . . . or by application of the third party beneficiary
status to the transaction between defendant and its retail
dealer . . . we have no occasion to decide. It is sufficient to
state that the liability . . . is imposed on the maker of false
statements and may be enforced by the ultimate consumer of
the product to whom the statements are directed.
1 69
In another Washington case, Murphy v. Plymouth Motor
Corp.,' 70 the plaintiff rolled his car, bending the top left side and
breaking the glass in the windshield and door. He introduced
sales literature showing a car being rolled at sixty miles per hour
167 96 F. 2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938).
168 290 Mich. 683, 288 N. W. 309 (1939).
169 Id. at 313.
170 3 Wash. 2d 180, 100 P. 2d 30 (1940).
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and an advertising photo illustrating a freight car resting partly
on top of the automobile, all of which was to indicate the strength
of the body. However, the court said that there was no express or
implied warranty that the car would always remain intact when
overturned at high speed.
The statement, "Tide is kind to hands," has produced two law
suits. In Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 17 1 the court said:
In the case of food products sold in original packages,
and other articles dangerous to life, if defective, the manu-
facturer, who alone is in a position to inspect and control
their preparation, should be held as a warrantor, whether he
purveys his product by his own hand, or through a network
of independent distributing agencies . .. The liability thus
imposed springs from representations directed to the ultimate
consumer and not from the breach of any contractual under-
taking on the part of the vendor.172
However, the court held that the scope of the warranty was
limited "to the absence in the preparation in question of in-
gredients injurious to the skin of normal persons using the soap
in a normal manner." 173 But, the representation was found to
constitute negligence in Lehner v. Procter & Gamble Co.,174 in
that it tended "to build up in the public mind the belief that this
product is harmless to all users." In another granulated soap case,
the court held that the "guarantee of quality" on the box
"reached beyond the dealers to persons in the position of plain-
tiff."175
In Simpson v. American Oil Co.,17 6 on cans of insecticide,
along with the directions for use, was the statement: "Amox ..
is not poisonous to human beings, but is sure death to insects ..
Note with all its insect killing power Amox may be freely used
indoors." The plaintiff developed boils after using it. The court
stated:
Here we have written assurances that were obviously
intended by the manufacturer and distributor of Amox for
the ultimate consumer, since they are intermingled with in-
structions as to the use of the product; and the defendant
was so anxious that they should reach the eye of the con-
sumer that it had them printed upon the package in which
171 Supra n. 143.
172 Id. at 537.
173 Id. at 538.
174 206 Misc. 1103, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 121 (1954).
175 Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (1948).
176 217 N. C. 543, 8 S. E. 2d 813 (1940).
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the product was distributed. The assurances that the product
as used in a spray was harmless to human beings, while
deadly to insects, was an attractive inducement to the pur-
chaser for consumption, and such purchase in large quanti-
ties was advantageous to the manufacturer. We know of no
reason why the original manufacturer and distributor should
not, for his own benefit and that, of course, of the ultimate
consumer, make such assurances nor why they should not be
relied upon in good faith, nor why they should not constitute
a warranty on the part of the original seller and distributor
running with the product into the hands of the consumer for
whom it was intended.177
Similarly, where a wire rope supporting a scaffold broke,
killing the purchaser, and it was shown that representations were
made in the manufacturer's manual as to the tensile strength of
the rope, the court said that the plaintiff could recover by way
of breach of express warranty "provided the wire rope was used
... for a purpose intended." 178 In a later case involving injuries
resulting from a defective steering mechanism in a car, the court
said that recovery could be obtained "either on the theory of
breach of implied warranty of fitness for purpose and mer-
chantability, or upon the basis of common law negligence." 179
There are several cases involving only property damages
where lack of privity has not barred recovery. 8 0 In Laclede
Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co.,181 in which iron and aluminum
scrap pressed together was marked "scrap iron having value for
melting purposes only," the open hearth furnaces of the sub-
purchaser were damaged by overheating due to the mixture.
The court said that "the inclusion of the aluminum washers was
the same as the inclusion of a foreign substance in canned food,"
and that:
There is a trend in our Louisiana jurisprudence, as well
as over the whole United States, for the "magic of the
177 Id. at 815.
178 Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F. 2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
179 Magee v. General Motors Corp., 124 F. Supp. 606 (W. D. Pa., 1954).
180 Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S. W. 2d 859 (1931)
(clover seed with alfalfa label; misrepresentation was "a standing one ad-
dressed to the purchaser as the ultimate consumer."); Hoskins v. Jackson
Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (mislabeled watermelon seed; "liability
cannot be affected by the fact that the two were not acquainted, or had not
dealt directly with each other"); Cornelli Seed Co. v. Ferguson, 64 So. 2d
162 (Fla. 1953); U. S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Waco, 130 Tex. 126, 108 S. W.
2d 432, cert. den. 302 U. S. 749, 58 S. Ct. 266, 82 L. Ed. 579 (1937) (cast iron
pipe).
181 67 F. Supp. 751 (W. D. La., 1946).
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metaphysics of privity" to be no more applied. . . . The de-
fendant knew it was selling ferrous scrap at ferrous prices,
to be consumed by melting. It advertised its sale, calling at-
tention to the prohibition by the rules and regulations of the
0. P. A. and W. P. B. of packing in combination ferrous and
non-ferrous materials. It compressed and mixed scrap into
bundles, with its own hydraulic pressers, and the movement
by rail was immediately from defendant's Louisiana plant
to the complainant's plant on a bill of lading reciting "having
value for remelting purposes only." This is warranty by the
defendant, direct and implied, to the complainant. 8 2
These advertising and labeling cases have brought into
sharp focus the manufacturer's duty to warn of any danger in
his product. (This is usually involved in the "negligent ad-
vertising" cases, but is also sometimes applied in those in which
the count is based on warranty.) Thus the manufacturer must
make elaborate tests to ascertain any danger which may result
from reasonable use of his product. In a Massachusetts case l8 3 in-
volving a combustible paint, the defendant maintained that he
had no actual knowledge of the explosive character of the paint,
since he was not the actual manufacturer, but merely sold the
product under his name. The courts held that there was no need
to prove actual knowledge, since the manufacturer or one who
represents himself as such, must be presumed to know the nature
and quality of the resultant compound which he solicits the pub-
lic to purchase. Since this question is generally based on the
exercise of reasonable care, 8 4 it is possible to defeat this pre-
sumption of knowledge of dangerous characteristics, generally
in a case involving a long history of successful use. 8 5
Once the need for some warning has been ascertained, the
general view is that the manufacturer is held responsible for all
damage which is the foreseeable result of the failure to warn.8 6
However, some courts have recently held that the warning should
be given to the general buying, or even using public,' 87 "to those
182 Id. at 758. Cf., Pedroli v. Russell, 320 P. 2d 873 (Cal. App., 1958).
183 Thornhill v. Carpenter Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N. E. 474 (1915).
184 Hopkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 199 F. 2d 930 (3d Cir.
1952); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A. 2d 850 (1945); Nishida
v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 245 F. 2d 768 (5th Cir., 1957).
185 Cleary v. John M. Marls Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 38 (Sup. Ct.,
1940); Minion Hat Co. v. Gabriel, 199 F. Supp. 908 (D. C. N. Y., 1957).
186 West Disinfecting Co. v. Plummer, 44 App. D. C. 345 (1916); Cf. Smith
v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 605 (D. C. Va., 1957).
187 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F. 2d 26 (8th Cir.
1934); Altorfer Bros. Co. v. Green, 236 Ala. 427, 138 So. 415 (1938); Beadles
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whom the manufacturer, through his advertising and representa-
tions, invites to purchase or use the product." 188
Mere directions as to use are not sufficient if it is foresee-
able that the directions may be ignored.18 9 However, if the plain-
tiff knew, or had reason to know, of the danger from an in-
dependent source, the manufacturer's failure to warn or his
insufficient warning would not be the proximate cause of the
injury and the manufacturer would not be liable.190
In E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon,191 the court
listed five elements which must appear in order to justify the
plaintiff's recovery: (1) The plaintiff must show that the use
of the product, as recommended, was likely to cause injury; (2)
that the manufacturer knew or should have known this fact;
(3) that the plaintiff used the product strictly in accordance with
directions and recommendations; (4) that this use constituted the
proximate cause of the injury; and (5) that the plaintiff had no
knowledge of the danger inherent in the use of the product.
An early example of insufficient warning was the case of
Henry v. Crook,192 in which a child was burned while playing
with a sparkler. The wrapper stated that "The sparks are harm-
less. Do not touch glowing wire. Safe and Sane." The court
said that it was a jury question whether the warning "do not
touch glowing wire," coupled with the assurance that the article
was harmless, was sufficient.
v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N. E. 2d 405 (1951); Martin v. Bengue,
Inc., 25 N. J. 359, 136 A. 2d 626 (1957). Cf. Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139
Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926) (manufacturer absolved by warnings in
operator's manual).
188 Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty
to Warn, 41 Va. L. R. 145, 161 (1955); Cf., Wright v. Carter Products, Inc.,
244 F. 2d 53 (2d Cir., 1957).
189 Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N. E. 639 (1930);
Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., supra n. 184; Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
104 F. 2d 183 (2d Cir. 1937); Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N. Y.
227, 140 N. E. 571 (1923); Moran v. Dake Drug Co., 134 N. Y. Supp. 995
(Sup. Ct. 1912), aff'd. 155 App. Div. 879, 139 N. Y. Supp. 134 (4th Dept.,
1913); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 79 N. W. 2d
688 (Minn., 1956); Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla., 1958).
190 O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-Ray Co., 261 App. Div. 8, 24 N. Y. S. 2d
268 (2d Dept., 1940), 288 N. Y. 486, 41 N. E. 2d 177 (1942); Pease v. Sinclair
Refining Co., supra n. 189; Alexander v. Wrenn, 158 Va. 486, 164 S. E.
715 (1932); Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Ray, 121 Va. 318, 93 S. E. 601 (1917);
Mossrud v. Lee, 163 Wis. 229, 157 N. W. 758 (1916).
191 Supra n. 187.
192 Supra n. 181; Moran v. Dake Drug Co., supra n. 189; Martin v. Bartell
Drug Co., 155 Wash. 317, 284 Pac. 96 (1930); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
supra n. 184. Contra: Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 234
N. Y. Supp. 496 (1st Dept., 1930).
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Such decisions are only as they should be. In industry today,
it is possible to control operations with an amazing degree of
accuracy. Products today are tested with sonic and ultrasonic
devices, magnetic flux equipment, X-ray, nuclear methods, infra-
red, and numerous other testing devices and methods. If a
product is sold, and is unsafe due to some defect, it is very pos-
sible that the inspector was careless when it passed through the
line. The same is true of the analytical equipment today. There
are spectrophotometers, spectroscopes, spectrographs, electron
microscopes, X-ray diffraction equipment and many others to
identify the components of a product. If the product causes harm
due to deleterious ingredients, again the manufacturer logically
should be held liable. In this area, however, there are a rapidly
increasing number of suits based on allergies to an ingredient
in the product. Generally, the manufacturer is not liable if it
is an allergic reaction found in only an insignificant percentage
of the population, 193 but if the allergy is one common to a large
number of possible users, or has very serious effects, the seller
probably will be liable.194 This undoubtedly is how it will remain
until more of the antigens and their exact nature are identified
and evaluated. But it is probable that the manufacturers would
make a greater effort through their research facilities to ascertain
these antigens and their effects if they knew that they were to be
held liable.
193 Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 235 P. 2d 525, 26 A. L. R. 2d 958 (1951)
(1 in 1000); Briggs v. National Industries, 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P. 2d
110 (1949); Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S. W. 2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1933); Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A. 2d 502 (1941);
Stanton v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N. E. 2d 801 (1942);
Cumberland v. Household Research Corp. of America, 145 F. Supp. 782(D. C. Mass., 1956); Merrill v. Benate Vues Corp., 235 F. 2d 893 (10th Cir.,
1956).
194 Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, 122 N. J. L. 21, 4 A. 2d 73 (1939) (4 to 5%);
Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N. E. 2d 697, 121 A. L.
R. 460 (1939); Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N. W. 48
(1913); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N. E. 2d 693 (1946); Wright
v. Carter Products, supra, n. 188; Braun v. Raux Distr. Co., 312 S. W. 2d
758 (Mo. 1958).
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